Ports of entry,ports of no return

Europe's seaports move more legitimate cargo than any security service could realistically check, and organised crime has built its entire business model around that gap. Roughly 90 million containers pass through EU ports every year, and only around 2% of them are ever physically inspected — about 10% for cargo already flagged as high-risk. Traffickers exploit that margin constantly, through rip-on/rip-off loading, forged container reference codes, and, more and more, semi-submersible vessels built specifically to slip past radar and satellite detection. Between 2019 and mid-2024, more than 1,800 tonnes of illicit drugs were seized in or on their way to EU seaports, cocaine alone accounting for close to 82% of that total — and the trend is still moving upward, not downward. The UNODC's World Drug Report 2025 put global cocaine production at a record 3,708 tonnes in 2023, up roughly a third in a single year, largely on the back of expanding coca cultivation in Colombia. Meanwhile, reinforcing checks at Antwerp and Rotterdam hasn't actually shrunk the trade so much as pushed it elsewhere, what criminologists call the "balloon effect": squeeze one point and the flow simply reappears somewhere less protected, usually a smaller harbour with a fraction of the funding and none of the political attention.

That displacement points to something more structural than a few weak ports. Criminal networks function as one continent-wide system, able to switch ports, methods and routes within weeks of anywhere tightening its defences, while the EU's own response is still built port-by-port and country-by-country. The European Commission's October 2023 Roadmap to fight drug trafficking and organised crime laid out 17 actions across four priority areas, and its flagship measure, the European Ports Alliance, launched in January 2024 as a public-private partnership between Member States, port authorities, Europol and shipping companies, now includes sixteen major ports, among them Hamburg, Rotterdam and Marseille. But these are still largely voluntary, non-binding arrangements sitting on top of a system where customs, policing and port administration remain national, sometimes even regional matters. Tellingly, the Alliance's own one-year review in mid-2025 concluded it needed to expand precisely because criminal activity was already shifting toward the smaller ports left outside it, which says a lot about how uneven investment in scanners, staff vetting and data-sharing keeps handing networks new weak points faster than anyone can close them.

Think about the 2026 World Cup final between Spain and Argentina. For more than 100 minutes, Argentina kept Spain contained, defending compactly and forcing most attacks through the centre. Rather than persisting with the same approach, Spain remained patient, shifted the play into wider areas, and eventually found an opening. In extra time, a cross from Pedro Porro, an assist from Nico Williams and a finish from Ferran Torres were enough to decide the game.

Europe's seaports face a similar challenge. Criminal networks do not need to break through the most heavily protected port. They only need to find a weaker point somewhere else. In a network made up of hundreds of ports with different levels of security, resources and oversight, there will almost always be opportunities to exploit.

Success in one port does not necessarily mean that overall trafficking has been reduced. In many cases, it has simply been redirected.

Criminologists describe this as the "balloon effect". When enforcement becomes stronger in one location, trafficking routes often shift to another. As a result, success in one port does not necessarily mean that overall trafficking has been reduced. In many cases, it has simply been redirected.

The figures highlight the scale of the issue. Between 2019 and mid-2024, more than 1,800 tonnes of illicit drugs were seized in or on their way to EU seaports, with cocaine accounting for around 82% of the total. Antwerp and Rotterdam remain major entry points, but criminal groups have shown a remarkable ability to adapt. As controls increase in these ports, traffickers increasingly use smaller ports or alternative methods, including semi-submersible vessels designed to avoid detection.

This raises an important question. The challenge is not only how to intercept more drugs, but also how to make Europe's port network less vulnerable as a whole. While ports are connected through trade and logistics, security measures often remain largely national, with significant differences in funding, technology and enforcement capacity between Member States.

Galicia's coastline, the longest in Spain, has been a favourite entry point for Colombian cartels since the 1980s, first with tobacco and later with cocaine. Back then, the Medellín and Cali cartels spotted the potential of that stretch of coast and the smuggling infrastructure already built by local networks, which led Spain to quickly become the main gateway for Latin American cocaine into Europe.

Decades later, not much has changed. If anything, it's gotten worse. In December 2023, police in the port of Vigo pulled 7.5 tonnes of cocaine out of a shipment of frozen tuna, the largest seizure in the region's history. And 2025 has been even busier, with 11.5 tons seized in just ten months, more than all of the previous year combined, worth over €800 million, with authorities being increasingly worried about narco-submarines that are getting harder and harder to spot.

What's striking is how reactive the response still is. In early 2025, a passerby noticed a semi-submersible washed up on a beach, and that single discovery unravelled an entire criminal network operating out of the Costa da Morte: 20 arrests, including a Civil Guard officer, and over 1,500 kilos seized. It took a stroke of luck, not a system, to catch them.